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i. 
Introduction 
One of the main aspects of generalized recursion theory is 
that of definability. Take for instance notions like invariant 
definability and inductive definability. Also when one is gener-
alizing other parts of recursion theory - like computability -
questions relating to definability arise. 
Already the use of the term definability suggests that ties 
to model theory exist, and in fact this is one of the most impor-
tant interfaces between model theory and generalized recursion 
theory. As so often happens in mathematics, when two separate 
theories meet, this is of benefit to both. As examples in this 
context it should be enough to mention the "Barwise Compactness 
Theorem" where model theory is benefitting from methods of recur-
sion theoryj while the paper "Omitting ~Jpes; Application to Recur-
sion Theory." by Grilliot [8] is an example of the converse. 
The success of these exchanges of methods has so far been 
limited to situations where the domains or the languages are count-
able. There exist examples which show that if these countability 
conditions are dropped, not only do many of the nice relationsships 
between recursion theory and moilia theory disappear, but there is 
also no reasonable way to repair that situation. 
We have been interested in examples of uncountable situations 
where as many as possible of the interconnections of the countable 
are preserved. In our paper [111 we showed how some results from 
recursion theory can be applied to model theory to obtain new com-
pactness theorems for a class of uncountable languages. In this 
paper we take the other approach, that is, we study extensions of 
EA-logic and A-logic and their model theory, when A is uncount-
ii~ 
able of strong cofinality w • We show that it is possible to 
obtain completeness theorems for these logics 9 and use this to 
obtain new proofs of some results on inductive definability. In 
our applications to inductive definability we try to make the ana-
logy with the countable case as explicit as possible. In this way 
we are able to lift wellknown proofs from the countable theory 
(e.g. s-TI~ is L inductive definable, TI~ is first onrder in-
ductive definable)to new proofs of results like s-IT~ is L(P) 
inductive and rr~ is first order inductive over structures 
(A,E,R 1 ~ ••• ,Rk) when A is of strong cofinality w • 
We want to thank K. Jon Barwise for many helpfull suggestions 
during the preparation of this paper. 
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1. The Logics 
The object of this section is to discuss the syntax and seman-
tics of the logics known as EA-logic and A-logic. We have chosen 
to use the terminology of Grilliot [SJ~ since especially the term 
EA-logic now seems to have become standard. Our approach to EA~ 
logic and A-logic is,however~closer to the presentation in 
Barwise [ 3] of what the:re is called M-logic. The reader should 
note that the way we (and Barwise) define A-logic will differ 
slightly from that of Grilliot. 
In the following A will be some fixed transsitive set. A 
language L is a collection of relation, function and constant 
symbols. By a structure 'i7L for L - for short an L-structure -
we mean a pair (M,f) where f is a map with domain L and range 
relations, functions and constants over M such that f maps n-
ary relationsymbols to n-ary relations etc. M is called the 
domain of ·-rn.. and we will always assume that A c M . 
We will require that the la~1guage L is atmost countable, 
and we will always assume that the binary relationsymbol € is a 
member of L • Whenever we find it convenient we will use the 
standard notation, e.g. ·):--: = (M,E 9 R) is an L-structure (M,f), 
where L = [€,R} and f(€) = E , f(R) = R • 
Let 1+ be some language containing L , the unary relation 
symbol A and for each a E A the constant symbol a and possi-
bly a countable number of other symbols. 
1.1 Definition. Let (JC = (A, f) be an L-structure where € is 
interpreted as E n A >.A • 
a) An EA-structure for 1+ is a structure ) .. r = (B,g) 
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satisfying: 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
A 
the 
and 
the 
is 
is contained in the 
interpretation of 
interpretation of 
an end-extension of 
interpretation of A in lr 
' 
- ' a in ,:J" is a for all a E A 
' 
e; in b is such that (B,g!'JJ) 
(A 9 f) 
b) An A-structure for 1+ is an EA-structure A'~- = (B 9 g) 
for 1+ where the interpretation of A in J.;- is A • 
Note that our use of the terms "EA" and "A" in the above 
definition are slightly misleading, since the class of EA-struc-
tures and A-structures will depend on the whole of ~~ = (A,f) , 
not just on A • However 9 in any given context this should cause 
no confusion. 
By L (1:(.) we mean the ordinary finitary first order wm 
language of L (L+) . In any reference to formulas cp of L and 
L+ we will assume that cp is a member of L and L+ respec-
ww t!JW 
tively. The semantics of EA-logic (A-logic) will be the ordinary 
semantics of 1+ restricted to the class of EA-structures (A-
ww 
structures). We will use I= ( }=) to denote the satisfaction 
EA A 
relation of EA-logic (A-logic), and the corresponding semantic 
consequence relation T I= cp (T I= cp) and validity l=cp (}= <+>L 
EA A EA A 
where T c L+ and cp E 1+ 
- Wlil weJ 
When A is countable it is well known that one can introduce 
a complete notion of provability 1- ( 1-) for EA-logic (A-logic), 
EA A 
vn1ere we by complete refere to the fact that ~ and ~A satisfy 
EA 
the completeness theorem: 
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1.2 Completeness theorems for EA-logic and A-logic when A is 
countable. 
Assume then: 
T I= ~ (T I= ~) if and only if T f- cp ( T 1- cp) • 
EA A EA A 
To give this theorem some content, we will define 1- and 1- • 
EA A 
1.3 Axioms for EA-logic and A-logic. (Countable case.) 
i) A(a) is an axiom of EA-logic and A-logic for each 
a E A • In addition, the sentence 
Vx Vy(A(y) ~ xey- A(x)) is an axiom of A-logic. 
ii) Every atomic or negated atomic sentence of L u ra: I a E A} 
true in (A,f) , is an axiom of EA-logic and A-logic. 
1 • 4 
iii) The usual axioms of are all axioms of EA-logic 
and A-logic. 
Definition: Let T be a set of formulas of L+ • A finite 
formula cp E L+ 
UJUJ 
is a consequence of T in EA-logic (A-
logic), written T f- cp (T 1- ~) 
' 
if cp is contained in 
EA A 
the smallest set of formulas containing T and the axioms 
EA-logic and A-logic and closed under the following rules: 
i) (Modus ponens) If T " I-" cp and T 11 I-'' cp - w then 
T II r" "' . 
ii) (Generalisation) If T "1-" (cp- Hvn)) and vn not 
free in cp then T II I-" (cp ... vvn "'(vn)) • 
iii) (EA-rule) Given b E A " If T 1- ~(a/vn) for each 
EA 
a E b then T 1- Vvn(vneb -cp(vn)) • 
EA 
v) (A-rule) If T 1- cp(S/vn) for every a E A then 
A 
T lA_ vvn(A(vn)-cp(vn)) • 
of 
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(The use of "1-" under i) and ii) is to indicate that the 
rule apply to both l-
EA 
If T = ¢ we write 
and 
r-ep 
EA 
~) 
A 
( 1- cp) 
A 
for T 1- cp 
EA 
(T 1- cp). 
A 
Notice that the way things are set up~ the EA-rule is prov-
able in A-logic using the A-rule. We could of course have drop-
ped the requirement that A E L+, clause i) of 1.1.a) and axiom 
i) of 1.3, for EA-logic. We have included them purely for the 
sake of uniformity in the presentation of the two logics. Let us 
also point out that we are not requiring anything like proofs be-
ing members of A , in fact we have not even defined what a proof 
is, only the notion of provability is considered. 
If A is uncountable, the situation is altered considerably. 
Not only will the completeness theorem for EA-logic and A-logic 
fail, but for "most" A (for instance A= H(r..u 1 ) ) there are no 
way of repairing the incompleteness by adding new definable sets 
of axioms or new definable rules. (By definable we are referring 
to some coding of formulas as members of A , and to first order 
definable sets of codes over (A,f).) As we shall see,however, 
there is a class of nicely behaved uncountable sets A for which 
the failure of the completeness theorems are less serious, and we 
will use the rest of this section to describe these sets and the 
modification that has to be made to 1- and 
EA 
pleteness. 
1- , to obtain com-
A 
1.5 Definition: We say that the set A has (is of) strong co-
finality w if Ill E A and 
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i) A is closed under power (i.e. if a E A then 
power ( a) E A ) , 
ii) there exist a family (An I n E w} of transitive sets An ~ 
such that for each n : An E A and A = U A • 
nEw n 
The canonical examples of sets of strong cofinality w are v 
a 
(the set of sets of rank less that a) 
for limes a of cofinality w with a> w • Cia D Va.) • 
1.6 Axioms for EA-logic and A-logic when A has strong cofina-
lity w • 
The axioms for EA-logic and A-logic are the ones described 
under 1.3 and in addition: 
iv) 
v) 
(Distributive law) For each a E A and the 
following is an axiom of E-A logic and !=logic: 
az(ze: power( a) 1\ Vy(yE:Z ~> ye:a /\ cp))' where z does 
not occur free in cp • 
(Cfw distribution) For each a E A and each 
the following is an axiom of A-logic. 
+ cpe:L 
ww 
:Rz[A(z) "Fnc(z) /\ "z:w- power(a)" /'"a= U[z(i) lie:w}" 
1\ V ke:w(VXE:Z (k) :!Iy (A(y) ll.cp(x ~ y)) -
- :Rv (I ( v) 11. VxE: z ( :k) :!Iy e:vcp ( x ~ y) ) ) ] 
where z does not occur free in cp • 
The definition of consequence is now exactly as under 1.4 
except that iv) and v) above are included among the axioms. We 
keep the notation 1- and t- 9 it should be obvious in each case 
EA A 
if it is the countable or cofinality w version we have in mind. 
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The formulation of axiom v) will perhaps need some remarks 
to explain the use of the terms "Fnc(z)"~ "z:w _, power(a)" and 
"a= U[z(i)jie:w}". These should be taken as abbreviations for 
their usual definitions in terms of e: • If this is done properly 
one obtain that if 
'- "Fnc(b)" t\ "b:w ... power(a)"A "a= u['b(i)lie:w}"~ iA 
then b is really a function mapping w into the powerset of a ~ 
such that a = U (b ( i) I i E w} • 
We end this section by claiming the sucess of these new 
axioms. 
1.7 Completeness theorem for EA-logic and A-logic when A has 
strong cofinality w • 
Let C)( = (A~ f) be an L-structure where 
finality w ~ and let L- and r- be as I EA A 
If T c L+ 
' 
l'.P E L+ we then have: ww ww 
T I= cp (T I= cp) 
EA A 
if and only if T ,_ CD I , 
EA 
A has strong co-
above. 
( T 1- cp) • 
A 
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2. The Proofs 
This section will contain nothing but the proo.fs o.f theorem 
1.7, and could for that reason have been postponded until after 
the section on applications. When it is put here, it is with the 
hope that the reader should not postpone reading these proo.fs in-
definitely. We believe that there should be some novelity in the 
techniques involved. 
We will start by listing some definitions, conventions and 
observations to be used throughout the proofs. Assume for the rest 
of this section that the L- structure [X = (A,f) is fixed, where 
A is some set of strong cofinality w 
2.1 Definition. Let T be a set of sentences of 1+ • T is 
said to be consistent in EA-logic- for short EA-consistent-
(consistent in A-logic - A-consistent -) if for some sentence 
it is not the case that ( T }-- t:p/\ 1ep) • 
A 
The completeness theorem can now be restated as: 
2.2 T has an EA-model (A-model) if and only if T is EA-con-
sistent (A-consistent). 
For both instances of 2.2 the only if parts are almost imme-
diate. The only way these differ from the ordinary countable ver-
sions are due to the axioms iv) and v). 
That iv) is valid follows easily by using that A is closed 
under the powerset operation. (In the case of A-logic,iv) could 
have been replaced by the equivalent (in A-logic): 
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iv') 3:x(A(x) " Vy(yex <-> yea " ~)) • 
While iv) just by the way it is formulated requires A to be 
closed under power, iv') is valid also when A is super transi-
tive (i.e. a c b E A ==> a E A) • Not much is gained by this 
observation, however 9 since closure under power is needed in order 
to make v) valid.) 
To get a feeling for the content of axiom v) it is instructive 
to do the proof of its validity in some detail. 
Assume A = 
Let 
U A. , where 
. E l l -LQ_) 
L+ and the 
rJHU 
A. is transitive and power 
l 
A-structure 1n = (M,g) for 
given. Let c = [bE a ! }(L I= 3:y(A(y) "cp(b,y))} • Then c can be 
A 
written as (bE a l for some dE A 9 rm I= c:p(b,d)} = u c. ' where 
A iEw 1 
ci = {b E a I for some d E Ai ' (!L 1 A cp(b 9 a)} • 
Define f: !'J ..... power (a) by 
for i = 0 r a-c 
f(i) = l 
0. 1 l- for i > 0 • 
Then f E A , U f(i) = a 
i Er'J 
and for all i E m 
'"/'lZ l= [V:xefTD 3:y (A(y) "cp(x,y)) ..... Vxe:f(i) 3:.yc:Ai_ 1cp(x,y)] • 
A 
Hence ~v satisfy this particular instance of axiom v), and we 
conclude that axiom v) is valid. 
The other halves of the completeness proofs are less immediate 
and we need to do some more preparatory work, most of which are 
common to both logics. 
0 + + -r } Let L c L be L - (a : a E A • Notice that L0 is then 
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countable. 
From L 0 we form L~K - the Skolem lan@age o.f L 0 • (i.e. L~K 
is the smallest language K containing L0 such that for every 
formula :H:xt:p(x,y1, ..• ,yn) ,.. K there is a function symbol c ww 
tcp(y 1' • • • ,yn) E K • ) Hence 0 LSK is still countable. 
Let + be L~K u {a I a E A} It should be noted that + is LSK .. LSK 
not actually the Skolem language of L+ • The Skolem language of 
L+ would contain uncountably many (cardinality of A ) new Skolem 
functions. There is of course a natural correspondance between the 
Skolem language of L+ and L;K , namely by mapping the Skolem 
function tcp(a)(x1 , ••• ,xn) to the term t ('a,x1 , ••• ,x) cp n of 
+ Hence LsK will still play the role of providing witnesses for 
existential quantifiers of 
If T 
The Skolem axioms are all formulas of 0 LSK of the form: 
( ) ( t, c y 1 , ••• , Y ) I ) :H:xcp x' y 1 ' ••• ,y n - cp cp n x 'y 1 '• • • 'y n 
is any set of sentences of let be T + the uni-
versal closure of all Skolem axioms. 
From now on we will assume that the sequence (An I n E w) is 
chosen such that A = U A. , each A. is transitive, w E A0 and 
power (Ai) E Ai+1 • 
cofinality w .) 
.E J. J. J. w (This is possible by our definition of strong 
Let [cpi l i E rv } be some fixed enumeration of the formulas of 
2.3 Definition. To each formula cp. J. of L~K we define the 
formula of as follows: 
- 10 ,... 
x1 €A l\ ••• " x1 eA 1\ cp. (x1 ~ ••• 9 x1 ) ) ~ n . n 1 . 
l l 
where li is the number of free variables of cp. l and z is 
chosen such that z is not free in cp. . If cp . has no free l l 
variables, let ei(z) be: 
n 
ei(z) <-> Vx(xez <-> xeA 1\ cp.) n D n 1 
A central point in what will follow is contained in the next 
observation. 
2.4 If T is an EA-consistent (A-consistent) set of sentences 
of L;K , then there is some c E A such that 
is EA-consistent (A-consistent). 
This is seen by applying axiom iv) the appropriate number of times 
together with the EA-rule (A-rule). (If cpi has only one free 
variable, then one application of axiom iv) followed by one appli-
cation of the appropriate rule is enough, etc.) 
We should now be sufficiently prepaired for the remaining 
half of the completeness theorem for EA-logic: 
Assume T is an EA-consistent set of sentences of L+ • 
We will successively choose elements (i.::;,n, nEw) , 
such that the set 
is EA-consistent. 
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This can be done inductively as follows~ Suppose cj has 
m 
been chosen for all j _::: m and m < n 9 and for m = n and 
j < i .:::;: n 9 and such that TSK U (/\ [ 9~(c~) I j _:::m, m <n}} U 
(1\ ( 9~('c~) I j <i}} ( = TSK U (9'}) is consistent. Then at 
stage (n 2 i) of the construction choose some element ci of A n 
such that TSK U (9'} U (e~(c~)} is consistent. (This is possible 
by 2.4 ) 
Assuming this construction has been carried out, we asscciate 
with each c~ a set of sentences of 
(2) 
where A(m) = {(a19 ••• ,a ) I a. EA (i=1 , ••• ,m)} • n D m 1 n 
If cpi has no free variables, let n s. l be {CD. } if 
i ~~ c 
'l n 
h cpi} if ci n = ¢ 
(3) Let s = U si and s = u s n D . ::;:n n D nEw n l_ 
2.5 Claim: Suppose cp and w are sentences of + then 1 sK 9 
I not both cp and lcp are members of s 
II either cp or lcp is a member of s 
III TSK ~ s 
IV i) if cpA1jJ E S then cp E S and 1jl E s 
' 
ii) if G:x~E s then for some constant term t cp(t/x) E s 
v if tea E s for some constant term t 
' 
then there is a 
b E A such that t = b E S 0 
Before we enter a proof of 2.5, observe that it is now stan-
dard to show that the term model constructed from S is a model 
' 
' 
- 12 "'" 
of T , and by V in fact an EA-model. Hence the completeness 
theorem of EA-logic follows. 
Proof of 2.5. 
I and II: Assume the sentence of is given. Then by 
the definition of L;K ~ ~ has to be of the form ~i(a) for some 
~· ]. of 
0 LSK , a E A • (We take the case where q:Ji has one free 
variable, the general case is just a notational variant of this.) 
For some n E w we will have a E An and we can without 
loss of generality assume that n > i • This means that at stage 
(n~ i) ~· was considered, and either ~·(a) or ~~. (a) was put ]. ]. ]. 
into si (since si = [cp.(a) I a E c~} u hcpi Ca) }aEA-ci}) . n n ]. n n 
This proves II. 
Assume that cpi(a) was put in at this stage. That means in 
particular that TSK u [ e } 1- cp. (a) • If ·1cp ( =cpJ. (a)) was put 
n EA 2 
at some stage (m,j) we could then conclude that TSK U [em} 
TSK U (91} 
Ts u [e1 J • 
1- cp. (a) 
EA J 
~ cpA rep , 
EA 
III: If 
and hence for 1 = max[m,n} obtain that 
contradicting the EA-consistency of 
('(\ E T -- S '~-" SK then by II for some n but 
this would imply that ~Ku [;cp} had to be EA-consistent, 
which is absurd. 
IV: The proof of i) is straight forward, while ii) is taken care 
of by the Skolem axioms being contained in S • 
V: At first sight it seems perhaps a little surprising that we 
are able to obtain the "omitting types" result of V just by care-
lessly choosing the c~'s with EA-consistency as the only require-
ment. We shall see, however, that since the A.'s were choosen to ]. 
be transitive, there is in some sense a standard omitting types 
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argument involved. 
By the term t we mean the constant term t(a1 , ••• ,~) ob-
tained from of by substituting a. 
1. 
for x. 
1. 
(i = 1, ••• ,1) • The possibility of the list x1 , ••• ,x1 being emp-
ty is allowed. 
Hence t might be one of the terms of L+ or one of the new 
terms of + LSK , or a composition of both. What will be used is 
that the formula t('a1 '. 9 '9. al) e: a is an instance of the formula 
t(x1, ••• ,xl) e:xl+1 ( =cpi(x1, ••• ,xl+1)) of L~K • 
Assume t(a1 ,. •• , a1 ) e:a E S • Then it must have been put in 
at some stage (n,i) • Hence at this stage the formula ei was 
n 
considered and we have that for some sentence 9 of L;K the 
following is EA-consistent: 
In particular it follows that 
By applying the fact that An is transitive together with the 
EA-rule, we get: 
was considered where m = max(n,j} 9 and c j was choosen m 
such that for some e' of 
(2) TSK U (9'} U [vx1 , ••• ,x1 +1 (<xp ... ,x1+1)e:ci <-> 
x 1 E Am"· •• Ax1+1 EAmt\t(xp ... ,x1 ) = x1+1)} 
is consistent. 
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For some b E A we must then have~ 
m 
If not, we could use the EA-rule to obtain 
TSK U ( 8 } 1- It (a1 , ••• , a 1 ) eA which again by the transi ti vi ty m EA m 
of Am and the EA-rule would contradict (1). 
From (2) and (3) we are now able to conclude that 
t(a1 , ••• , a1 ) = b E ~~ ,::: S which proves V • --1 
For many details of the completeness proof for A-logic, we 
will be able to refer to the completeness proof for EA-logic. 
It will therefore be convenient first to give an outline of the 
A-logic proof by a comparision with that of EA-logic. 
As in the previous proof, our main object will be to construct 
a set S of sentences with the properties of 2.5 except that V 
will have to be replaced by: 
V': If A(t) E S for some constant term t, then there is a 
b E A such that t = b E S • 
Also the de£inition of S will be essentially the same as 
before. That is; we will construct elements ci of A by appea-n 
ling to the consistency of (of course this time the A-
consistency), and define the sets s~ from 
EA-logic, to obtain S as we did earlier. 
i 
c 
n 
exactly as for 
There is, however, one nontrivial difference hidden in this 
description due to the fact that we cannot afford to be as generous 
in our choice of the ci's as in the previous proof. 
n 
That is 
we will have to add some requirements on the c!'s in addition to 
the A-consistency of e~(c!) at that particular stage of the 
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construction. The way this will be achieved is by the introduction 
of some auxiliary constants at each stage which will be required to 
satisfy some new boundedness conditions. This will have the effect 
of restricting the possible A-consistent choices of the 
Assume as before that {cpi I i E w} is an enumeration of the 
formulas of In addition let {t.!iEw} be some enumera-J. 
tion of the function symbols of 
For each number i and n , we define the formulas 
and \Ji(u, v) • 
2.6 Definition. 
'lli(z) 
n 
TJ!(z) <-> "Fnc(z) 1\ z:Ui ... Power An 1\ In = u {z(k) IkE w}" 
D 
r, V s e: w 3:v [A ( v ) t\ v x 1 , ••• , x1 . e: z ( s ) (-~A ( t i ( x 1 , .... , x1 . ) v 
J. J. 
t(x1 , ••• ,x1 .) e:v)] • 
J. 
If ti has no argument places (i.e. ti is a constant term 
of L~K ) the definition of TJ~ and \Ji shall oe as above 
except that the quantifiers Vx1' ••• ,x1 _e:z(s)(e:u) are omitted. 
J. 
2.7 Observation. Assume T is some A-consistent set of sentences. 
T U {TJ~(f)} 
f E A : f: (!J ... power An , An = U f( i) 
iEw 
and Then for some 
is A-consistent. 
Given that T U [n~(f)} is A-consistent there is for each 
j E w some d E A such that 
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Proof: The proof is just a simple exercise in how to apply the 
A-rule to axiom v) of 1.6. The instances of axiom v) that should 
be considered, is for formulas like IA(t(x)) v t(x) = y • 
Assume now that T is an A-consistent set of sentences of 
A-logic and let TSK be as before. Our aim will be for each 
n E w 
' 
to choose elements fi 
m ~ 
di,j and ci 
m m of A for i ,5ffi ,5L'l ' 
j _::n such that the following set of sentences is A-consistent: 
(*) 
TSK U {/\til!Ct!) I i ,:::m~m~n}} U (.1\.{vi(f!(j),d!'j) I i ~m,m ~n, j~n}} 
U [/\[e!<c!) li_::m_::n}} ( D TSK u [nn} u [vn} u {en} D TSK U [xn}) 
To see that this actually is possible, assume that choices 
are made for each m < n such that TSK U [Xn_ 1} is A-consistent. 
Then start successively for each i < n to choose such that 
T8Ku[xn_ 1} U (nn} becomes A-consistent. (This is possible by 
observation 2.7.) Then start with the di,j,s 
' 
say, by for each 
i < n construct for all j < n 
has been constructed such that TSK U 
sistent, construct the ci's as for 
n 
n 
etc. 
[xn-1} u 
EA-logic 
Finally after 
(nn} u (vn} is 
except that the 
sistency now of course will refer to the A-consistency with 
T SKU ( Xn-1 } I I [ Tln} U [ vn} • 
vn 
con-
con-
The order in which this construction is carried out is imma-
terial (except that obviously fi will have to be defined before n 
di,j ) what matters is that n , v and en are defined for each 
n n n 
n in such a way that (*) becomes A-consistent. 
From this point on we construct si from ci and n n s from 
si exactly as for EA-logic, and we make the following claim. 
n 
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2.8 Claim: Suppose and are sentences of + LSK 9 then s 
satis~sth€ properties I to IV of 2.2 ~ and in addition 
V': If A(t) E S for some constant term t, then for some bE A, 
t=bES. 
As previously remarked, I - IV yield that the term model constructed 
from S will be a model of T , but by V' it has to be an A-model. 
Hence what remains is to prove the claim. 
Proof of 2.8: The proofs of I - IV are almost carbon copies of the 
corresponding proofs for EA-logic. The fact that the this 
time are chosen more carefully does not alter anything. 
V': Assume A(t(a)) E S where t is some function symbol of 
0 t is t. (x) (We assume for simplicity that t has LSK 
' 
say, . 1 
only one variable place.) Suppose now that A(t.(x)) 
1 
is the j I th 
0 formula in the enumeration of LSK 
' 
and that a E A for some 
n 
n ~ max[i,j} . From these assumptions it now follows that A(t(a)) 
E s~ (otherwise lA( ti (a)) E s~ , contradicting A( ti (a)) E S ) • 
Hence we can conclude that 
T SK U {X } t-- A ( t . (a) ) • 
n A 1 
In constructing Xn the function fi was introduced, and from n 
the formalized facts about the constant symbol fi in A-logic 
n 
(i.e. TSK U [xn} t-- ~!Cf!)) it follows that t! actually maps 
w into power (An) in such a way that An = U f!(k) • In parti-
kEw . 
cular this gives us some k E w such that a E f~(k) • 
At some later stage m = max{n,k} , we will then have that 
T U {xm} !A ti(a)ed!'k • This, by the definition of vn • 
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Hence for some 1 E w we get that d!'k E A1 , and by apply-
ing the A-rule and the fact that A1 is transitive, it follows 
that ( } l (-) -T u xm 'A ti a eA1 • 
This corresponds to the point in the proof of 2.5 where (1) 
of that proof was obtained, and from this point on we can make use 
of the details of that proof~ obtaining as the final conclusion 
that for some b E A , ti(a) = b E S • 
To end this section we will make some remarks on the role of 
axiom v) in A-logic. 
Suppose we would try to prove the completeness theorem for 
A-logic the way it was done for EA-logic (except that EA-consis-
tency should be replaced by A-consistency in the choices of the 
ci's) Also in that case there would be implicit a construction n • 
of functions f: w ~ power (An) • 
ci's for formulas like t(x) = y 
for some b E Ak} ) • 
This, by the construction of 
(i.e. f ( k) = [a E A I <a, b > E c i n . k 
This stepwise construction of functions would, however, lead 
to serious trouble at the point of our proof of V' where we could 
conclude that the given a E A was a member of f(k) for some k • 
n 
This, because we at any particular stage would have construc-
ted only a finite part of f , say fjm , and there is no reason 
m 
to believe that A = U f(i) 
n i=o 
or that a E f(k) for some k<m. 
The feature of axiom v) is exactly that it solves this problem 
by enabling us to choose the whole of f in one step. 
We refer the reader to the papers by c. Karp r1o] and J. Green 
[6], where they in their construction of consistency properties are 
entering the same problem. It should be fair to say, however, 
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that their solution is a little less satisfactory since they must 
require that the sequence (An In E w) is definable in the logic 
considered. This leads to an unnecessary loss of generality in 
the formulation of their main results. 
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3. The Applications 
Let the transitive set A and the L-structure ()L = (A~ f) 
be fixed. We recall that a relation R over A is said to be 
s::.n~ definable on C;'L. (or just s:,,,T~ on OC ) if there is a L: 
formula w(x1 , ••• ,xn,s1 , ••• ,Sn) of L U {a! a E A} U [S1 , ••• ,Sm) 
such that: 
Let L+ be as in section 1 and assume that L+ contains a coun-
table list of new relation symbols, including s 1 , ••• ,sm. We can 
now use the fact that L: formulas persist under end-extensions to 
obtain that 
R(a1 , ••• ,an) <=> (N,h) !- 1jl(a1 , ••• ,an) for all L+-struc-
tures (N,h) such that (N,hfL) is an end-extension of()(. 
If we reformulate this using the terminology of section 1 , we get 
( 1 ) R ( a 1 , ••• , a ) <=> != ~~ ( a1 , ••• , a ) . 
n EA n 
If A is countable or A is of strong cofinality m we can 
use the completeness of EA-logic to obtain 
Suppose the formulas of is coded in some way as elements 
of A • If for instance A is closed under ordinary pairing it is 
standard to show that the coding can be carried out such that the 
predicate Ax (y) <-> "y is a code of one of the axioms i) - iii) 
o D 
of 1 • 3 II' is b. definable over ex . If in addition A is closed 
under the power set operation, the predicate Ax (y) <-> "y is a 1 D 
code of one of the axioms of i) - iv) of 1.6 11 can be given a 6 
definition over the structure ( i 'tl co ) f_.IL;...; - for short a kUP ) defi~ 
- 21 -
ni tion - where .3J is the graph of the power set relatio.n on A 
c-·. (i.e. Y (a~b) <->a= power (b)). 
If we use this together with the definition of 1- we obtain 
EA 
that the set Val of codes of valid formulas of EA-logic can be 
given an :inductive definition r as follows: 
(3) x E r(S) <-> Ax(x) v 3:y( ry --x' E S I' yES) 
D 
il r :t V 3:y ( y = rep .... \jl ( V) .f\ y E S !\ X = cp .... V v $ ( v ) ) 
r - , r _ '1 
V 3:y(Vze:y cp(Z/v) ES f'..X = Vv(ve:y-tc:p(v))),. 
vfuere Ax is either Ax0 or Ax1 depending on A being count-
able or of strong cofinality w • 
Hence we get that Val(x) ~> x E Ir • (For terminologi con-
cerning inductive definability~ see for instance our paper [11].) 
If we apply this result to (2), we obtain: 
We summarize what is obtained so far in the next theorem. 
3.1 Theorem. a) Assume A is countable, transitive and suffi-
ciently closed under pairing (closure m1der set theoretic 
1 pairing is more than enough) then every s~rr 1 relation on 
01. = (A, f) is ~ inductively definable over ()[. 
b) Assume A is of strong cofinality w , then every 
relation on OL (in fact on (Ol;JJ)) 
definable over CJt • 
is L(9 ) 
"' 
inductively 
Proof: Immediate by the previous remarks. Just observe that (3) 
is a L ( L(:j) ) ) definition of r • 
""' 
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3.1 a) is due toP. Aczel [1] and the proof we just gave is iden-
tical to his proof. 3.2 b) is due to Ph.W. Grant [6], but his 
proof is different as he employs a game theoretic argument. 
Notice that if the relation R is on (A,f) in some 
relation 
where T 
T (i.e. R(a1 , ••• ,an) <=> (A,f;T) I= '±'(a1 , ••. ,an,T+)) 
1 
occurs positive in the s-n1-formula '±'), then the pre-
vious proof is easily modified to yield that T might be chosen 
to occur positive in the inductive definition r . 
This can be achieved by replacing the predicate Ax(x·) in (3) 
by Ax(x) v T+(x) when T+(x) <D> x E (rT(a1 , ••• ,a1 )1j(a1 , ••• ,a1)E T}. 
(i.e. T+ is the codes of the positive diagram of T.) The ob-
servation to be made is that: 
for the appropriate w • 
By appealing to our lemma 2.7 of [11] we obtain, using the termi-
nology of Definition 1.1 of that paper, that if (A,f) is coun-
table admissible ( A has strong cofinali ty w and <A, f, P) is 
admissible) then (A,f) ((A,f,P )) is uniformly ~ 1 -complete. 
Hence by our theorem 1.2 of [11] we get: 
3.2 Theorem. 
a) (The Barwise Compactness Theorem) If (A,f) is count-
able admissible, then (A,f) is f 1-compact. 
b) (The Barwise-Karp Compactness Theorem) If A has strong 
cofinality w and (A,f) is power set admissible (i.e. 
(A,f,P) is admissible), then (A,f) is f 1 ('J'-;) com-
pact. 
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The proof we outlined for 3.2 a) is similar to the proof described 
by Aczel in [2]. Our proof of b) is new since it involves the EA-
completeness, however, given the EA-completeness theorem, the 
proof of b) is of course woll known. 
The relationship that exists between EA-logic 
carries over to the similar relationship between and A-logic. 
Since the arguments are similar to the ones just given in the be-
ginning of this section, we restrict our selves to give the con-
clusion: 
If R is on (A,f) , then for some first order formula 
w of L+ 
Again we can for sufficiently nice A code the formulas of L+ 
and let Ax be the codes of the axioms; i) - iii) if A is coun-
table and i) - v) if A is of strong cofinality w • The indue-
tive definition f' of the codes of valid formulas of A-logic 
is the same as r of EA-logic, except that the disjunct relating 
to the EA-rule is replaced by the A-rule: 
Vz( rcp(Zfv)l E SAx = rvv(A(v) ..... cp(v) )1) 
This has the effect that f' not is Z definable,but we obtain: 
3.3 (The Abstract Suslin-Kleene Theorem) 
a) Assume A is countable and closed under pairing, then 
every n~-relation over (A, f) is first order inductivly 
definable over (A,f) • 
b) If A is of strong cofinality t!..l ' then every Q~-relation 
over (A,f) is first order inductivly definable over (A,f). 
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(The power set relation does not enter into the formulation of b) 
since A is closed under power and hence the power set relation 
is first order definable, in fact rr? definable, over (A,E).) 
It should not be nessecary to repeat the history of a), let 
us just mention that the proof we have given here is implicit in 
Barwise [3]. 
The result 3.2 b) is due to Chang-Moschovakis [5] even if it 
there is phrased a little less general. Our proof is new, however, 
the Chang-Moschovakis proof involves a game argument. 
The previous comments regarding 1 s-~1 in some extra relations 
1 
apply equally well to ] 1 • Thus by adding codes of the positive 
diagrams of the relations involved, we obtain, with the terminology 
of our paper [11], that (A,f) is a uniform Kleene structure where 
A is as in 3.3 a) or b). 
As we showed in [11] also this result can be used to obtain 
~ 1 -compactness theorems, but this requires some more effort than 
the ones in 3.2 , and is the main content of that paper. 
We have during the preparation of this paper had hopes that 
it should be possible to prove a stronger omitting types theorem 
than the ones implicit in the completeness theorems for EA-logic 
and A-logic. The aim would be to do some analogs of the results 
in Grilliot [8]. At present we have serious doubts that this is 
possible, but with the hope that someone should find a counter 
example (or a proof) we will be more explicit and state one open 
problem. 
Does the Gandy-Kreisel-Tait Theorem hold for structures (A,E) 
when A has strong cofinality ~ ? (i.e. is the ~~-relations 
- 25 -
of (A,E) exactly the relations definable in all A-models?) 
A negative answer to this would set a limit for how general omit-
ting types theorems it is possible to get in this setting, while 
a positive answer should indicate the existence of more general 
omitting types theorems. 
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